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INTRODUCTION
It is a great honor for me to deliver the Helen Wilson Nies Memorial
Lecture in Intellectual Property Law at Marquette University Law School. I
want to begin with a few words about Judge Nies. I had the good fortune of
speaking with Judge Nies about her career years ago when she returned to her
alma mater, the University of Michigan Law School, and gave a guest lecture
to my patent law class.
Judge Nies was a distinguished alumna who graduated Order of the Coif in
the Class of 1948, and we are very proud of her at Michigan. She had a
distinguished career in trademark law before her appointment to the federal
bench in 1980. When the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created
in 1982, she became one of its first judges, and eventually served as chief judge.
Although the Federal Circuit is often viewed as a specialized patent court, prior
to her appointment Judge Nies had little background in patent law.2 But of
course, patent law is still law, and Judge Nies was an excellent lawyer, so she
rolled up her sleeves and figured it out. I admire that fearlessness, especially
at a relatively late career stage. Rarely can individuals see where their career
will take them, and if we want to take advantage of new opportunities—or
1. Robert & Barbara Luciano Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. This
research was supported by the William W. Cook endowment of the University of Michigan Law
School. My understanding of this topic owes much to a collaborative project with Harold Varmus. See
Rebecca Eisenberg & Harold Varmus, Insurance for broad genomic tests in oncology, 358 SCIENCE
1133 (2017).
2. Her husband, John Nies, was also a Michigan law grad and patent lawyer.
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simply provide the advice clients require in an ever-changing world—from
time to time we all need to roll up our sleeves and learn something new.
Among Judge Nies’s lasting contributions to the Federal Circuit were her
early opinions on legal process and procedural issues.3 These decisions were
vital to the new court’s mission to consolidate appellate jurisdiction over patent
law and to standardize its interpretation.4 Judge Nies’s opinions on burden of
proof, standard of review, the role of juries, and the authority of prior opinions
of other courts are still cited today, while many substantive decisions of her
Federal Circuit brethren from the same era have been overturned by subsequent
decisions of the Supreme Court.5 The enduring significance to the patent
system of these process issues reminds us that patent law is not an island apart
from the rest of the legal system. It works alongside other bodies of law, and
operates through rules for administrative and judicial practice that are not
unique to patent law.
The primary focus of my patent scholarship has been biomedical
innovation. Patent law is often credited with motivating investments in
biomedical innovation, particularly from the pharmaceutical industry, which
relies heavily on patent protection and works hard to strengthen patent laws
throughout the world. But patent law does not work alone. This is a lesson I
keep learning. Other sources of legal regulation provide crucial assistance
when patent law would otherwise fail to achieve its goals.
Today, I examine the intersection of patent law, FDA regulation, and
Medicare coverage in a particularly promising field of biomedical innovation:
genetic diagnostic testing. First, I will discuss current clinical uses of genetic
testing and directions for further research, with a focus on cancer, the field in
which genetic testing has had the greatest impact to date. Second, I will turn to
patent law and address two recent Supreme Court decisions that called into
question the patentability of many of the most important advances in genetic
testing.6 Third, I will step outside patent law to take a broader view of the legal
environment for new developments in genetic testing, with a focus on two
federal regulatory agencies: the Food & Drug Administration (FDA), which
regulates new drugs and medical devices under statutory standards for safety
and effectiveness; and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
3. See Stephen A. Soffen, Hon. Helen W. Nies – A Conscientious Jurist Who Led the court in
Defining the Role of Juries in Patent Cases, 8 J. FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y 97, 97–99 (2014) (examining
Judge Nies’ opinions on the role of the jury, summary judgment, and standard of review).
4. See id.; Helen W. Nies, The Federal Circuit: A Court for the Future, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 571,
571 (1992).
5. See Soffen, supra note 3, at 100–01.
6. This is how I came to this topic as a patent scholar. I was worried that the absence of patent
protection might undermine incentives for innovation in this important field.
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which sets reimbursement policies for Medicare under statutory standards that
limit coverage to technologies that are reasonable and necessary.
Last, with this background, I will explain a recent surprising development:
developers of next generation sequencing (NGS) diagnostic tests for tumor
DNA have begun seeking FDA approval or clearance for tests they are at liberty
to provide, and in fact have already begun to provide, without asking FDA for
permission. The answer lies in understanding the rules and practices that
govern health insurance coverage and the important role of FDA in assessment
of new technologies. This episode sheds an interesting light on the roles and
interactions of different sources of legal regulation in supporting innovation
outside the patent system.
I. CURRENT TRENDS IN GENETIC TESTING AND A SHIFT IN CANCER
DIAGNOSES
Advances in genetics and molecular biology have transformed scientific
understanding of the basis of many diseases, identifying new molecular targets
for therapy and rearranging diagnostic categories. Nowhere are these
developments more striking than in cancer. Traditional cancer diagnosis
focuses on the tissue of origin of a tumor. Caregivers look to the tissue of origin
to specify what type of a cancer a patient has, and then consider different
treatment options depending on whether the patient has breast cancer, colon
cancer, lung cancer, etc. But increasingly it appears that what really matters is
not so much the tissue of origin, but the genetic mutation that is driving the
tumor.
Studies to date have revealed hundreds of genes in which mutations
associated with cancer arise.7 Some of these mutations are common and well
understood, while others are rare, and their role in cancer remains unclear.8
Drug companies have developed a new generation of “targeted therapies” that
are designed to work against tumors that have specific mutations.9 Sometimes
these targeted therapeutic products are developed and submitted to FDA for
approval along with a “companion diagnostic” test to detect the targeted
mutation.10
7. A catalogue of these genes is maintained at Cancer Gene Census, Catalogue of Somatic
Mutations in Cancer, http://cancer.sanger.ac.uk/census#cl_search [https://perma.cc/974D-K537].
8. See id.
9. Nickolas Papadopoulos, Kenneth W. Kinzler & Bert Vogelstein, The role of companion
diagnostics in the
development and use of mutation-targeted cancer therapies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 985, 985
(2006).
10. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., In Vitro Companion Diagnostic Devices: Guidance for Industry
and
Food
and
Drug
Administration
Staff
5–6
(2014),
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FDA-approved indications for targeted therapeutics may specify tissue of
origin as well as the genetic mutation targeted by the drug. An example is the
drug Herceptin® (trastuzumab), one of the earliest FDA-approved targeted
cancer therapies.11 Initially, FDA approved the drug “for treatment of patients
with metastatic breast cancer whose tumors overexpress the HER2 protein and
who have received one or more chemotherapy regimens for their metastatic
disease.”12 Later, FDA expanded the approved indications to include treatment
of patients with tumors from other tissues that have the same genetic signature,
specifically “the treatment of patients with HER2-overexpressing metastatic
gastric or gastroesophageal junction adenocarcinoma.”13 Although breast
cancer and gastroesophageal cancer arise in different types of tissues, if the
resulting tumors are overexpressing the HER2 protein, both groups of patients
are candidates for treatment with the same targeted drug.14 In 2017, for the first
time, FDA expanded the approved indications for another targeted cancer drug,
Keytruda® (pembrolizumab), to include all tumors with the specified genetic
profile, regardless of tissue of origin.15 In the future, the most meaningful
information for diagnosis of cancer type and selection of treatment may no
longer be tissue of origin, but rather results of genetic testing.16 However, much
work remains to be done to understand the significance of different mutations
in driving different cancers.
Meanwhile, the cost of more extensive DNA sequencing has fallen
significantly with the advent of next generation sequencing (NGS) technology,
which makes it feasible to derive more information from a single DNA sample
quickly and at little incremental cost relative to narrower tests that only look
for particular mutations.17 This technology alters the logical approach to

https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocument
s/UCM262327.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8ZB-NPLB].
11. Papadopoulos et al., supra note 9, at 989.
12. Letter from Jay P. Siegel to Robert L. Garnick (Sept. 25, 1998),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/1998/trasgen092598L.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TP3N-DUK9].
13.
See
current
label
for
Herceptin®
(trastuzumab)
at
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2016/103792s5330lbl.pdf (revised Mar. 2016)
[https://perma.cc/BGF5-55YE].
14. Id.
15. FDA News Release, FDA approves first cancer treatment for any solid tumor with a
specific
genetic
feature
(May
23,
2017),
https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm560167.htm
[https://perma.cc/R8ZW-9HNG].
16. David M. Hyman, Barry S. Taylor, & Jose Baselga, Implementing Genome-Driven
Oncology, 168 CELL 584, 584 (2017).
17. Erwin L. VanDijk et al., Ten years of next-generation sequencing technology, 30 TRENDS
IN GENETICS 418, 418–19 (2014).
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genetic testing for cancer patients. In 1998, when Herceptin was first approved
for treatment of HER2/neu overexpressing breast cancer,18 it seemed sensible
to test tumor DNA from breast cancer patients only for the particular aberration
that would indicate a likely response to Herceptin. But today, with a larger set
of targeted therapies available against different mutations and with the ability
to sequence more DNA at lower cost, it is questionable whether such limited
testing still makes sense. For a modest incremental cost, it is now possible to
fully sequence, a DNA sample from a patient’s tumor, the 350–400 genes
known to be associated with cancer, making it possible to screen patients for
multiple treatments at once. Even if no targeted therapies exist for the
mutations that are found in a patient’s tumor DNA, such testing could shed light
on the patient’s diagnostic odyssey.19 It could also contribute to understanding
of cancer by illuminating the mutations that may be causing particular tumors.20
Multiple laboratories now offer such tests, both in academic medical centers
and in commercial firms.
II. PROCESS PATENTABILITY AND THE SUPREME COURT
The proliferation of new tests suggests a flourishing of innovation in the
field of genetic testing, despite recent developments in patent law that have cast
serious doubt on the patentability of many of the most important advances in
DNA diagnostics. Doubts about patentability arise from two U.S. Supreme
Court decisions.
First was the Court’s 2012 decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories.21 The patent at issue claimed a diagnostic algorithm
that involved observing a biomarker and then drawing a diagnostic inference
about the patient’s need for treatment.22 More specifically, the patent claimed
a method of optimizing treatment with thiopurine drugs by measuring levels of
certain drug metabolites in a patient’s blood and determining on that basis
whether the drug dosage needs to be adjusted.23 A patient’s body produces
metabolites as the body breaks down a drug after ingesting it. The patent
recited both a lower level of drug metabolites that would indicate a need for a
higher dosage of the drug (to be sure that it is therapeutically effective) and an
upper level that would indicate a need to lower the dosage (to minimize toxic
18. See Siegel, supra note 12, at 1.
19. See Hyman et al., supra note 16, at 585.
20. Id. at 585–86.
21. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 66–67 (2012) (noting
that the patent at issue involved “the use of thiopurine drugs to treat autoimmune diseases.”).
22. Kevin E. Collins, Prometheus Laboratories, Mental Steps, and Printed Matter, 50
HOUSTON L. REV. 391, 398 (2012).
23. Id. at 399.
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side effects).24 The Supreme Court held that the patent claims were invalid
because the metabolite levels that would indicate a need to adjust the dosage of
the drug are unpatentable “natural laws,” and once those natural laws are
excluded, the remaining steps in the claim were not sufficiently novel to count
as a patentable invention.25 Although it may have been possible to interpret
this decision narrowly, a fair reading of the Court’s analysis seems to count all
predictions regarding the effects of treatment in patients as “natural laws.”26
Subsequent decisions have read the Mayo decision broadly, dealing a major
blow to patenting strategies for innovative diagnostic tests.27
The next year the Supreme Court dealt another major blow to patentability
of DNA diagnostics with its decision in Association for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics.28 The patent at issue in that case claimed DNA molecules
with sequences corresponding to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes associated
with susceptibility to developing breast cancer.29 The Supreme Court held that
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, as they exist in patients’ cells, are unpatentable
because they are natural products.30 Again, although it might be possible to
read the opinion more narrowly, a fair reading of the Court’s analysis seems to
count all naturally occurring DNA biomarkers used in genetic testing as
“natural products.”31
Considered together, these two decisions cast considerable doubt on the
patentability of both the biomarkers and the associated diagnostic predictions
involved in genetic diagnostic testing. Subsequent lower court decisions have
offered little reason to expect that these decisions will be narrowly interpreted.32
III. GENETIC TESTING AND FEDERAL REGULATION
What does doubtful patentability mean for incentives for investment in
development of genetic diagnostic tests? If the conventional wisdom for the

24. Id. at 398.
25. Id. at 403. For a fuller analysis and critique of this opinion, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 BOSTON U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256, 264–70 (2015).
26. See id. at 266.
27. See Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom, 788 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016).
28. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576, 576 (2013) (holding “a
naturally occurring DNA segment is . . . not patent eligible.”).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 580.
31. Id.
32.
Anne Paxton, AMP v. Myriad: driving or disrupting innovation? (2017),
http://www.captodayonline.com/amp-v-myriad-driving-disrupting-innovation/
[https://perma.cc/864Y-FM9H].
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biopharmaceutical industry applies to diagnostics,33 one might worry that
patent incentives are essential and that without reliable patent protection,
investments in this promising field will dry up. On the other hand, the Supreme
Court decisions that cast doubt on the patentability of diagnostic inventions
were applauded by some innovators in this field, especially in university
laboratories that were eager to offer NGS testing to examine a great many genes
in a single test, without having to worry about multiple patent holders trying to
stop them.34 Perhaps innovation in genetic testing is different from the
paradigm case of new drug development, the example long used to illustrate
the need for patents to preserve incentives for new product development.
Perhaps patents are less necessary, or even counterproductive, for incentives to
develop new diagnostic tests.
One difference between diagnostics and therapeutics is the regulatory
burden imposed on the two types of products. The costs and risks of FDA
regulation loom large in standard accounts of why the pharmaceutical industry
needs patents on new drugs.35 Before a firm may lawfully sell or even ship a
new drug in commerce, FDA must approve it under statutory standards for
safety and efficacy based on data from clinical trials that meet stringent
scientific standards.36 These trials are both costly and risky, with many failures
at every stage. Even after approval, many drugs get withdrawn from the market
after new risks come to light. Or after further data shows that risks were more
substantial than was initially apparent. Drug developers must cover the costs
of failure with lucrative sales of successful products, and patents allow them to
charge prices that are high enough to do that.
The FDA has statutory authority to regulate genetic tests for safety and
efficacy as medical devices.37 But it regulates medical devices less stringently
than drugs.38 Medical devices are a diverse category that ranges from simple
33. See Iain Cockburn & Genia Long, The importance of patents to innovation: updated
crossindustry comparisons with biopharmaceuticals, 25 EXPERT OPINION ON THERAPEUTIC PATENTS
739, 739 (2015).
34.
Anne Paxton, AMP v. Myriad: driving or disrupting innovation? (2017),
http://www.captodayonline.com/amp-v-myriad-driving-disrupting-innovation/
[https://perma.cc/864Y-FM9H].
35. Joseph A. DiMasi, Henry G. Grabowski, & Ronald W. Hanson, Innovation in the
Pharmaceutical Industry New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 26 (2016) (noting
that for approved drugs, the “fully capitalized total cost estimate is $2558 million.”).
36. 21 U.S.C. § 355.
37. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Draft Guidance for Industry, Food and Drug Administration
Staff, and Clinical Laboratories: Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory-Developed Tests
(LDTs),
7
(Oct.
3,
2014),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocument
s/UCM416685.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LW9-PG2A].
38. Id. at 8–9.

EISENBERG_12820 (DO NOT DELETE)

8

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

2/4/20 10:17 AM

[Vol. 23:1

items like tongue depressors and bandages to complex implanted devices like
cardiac pacemakers.39 The statute directs FDA to take a stratified, risk-based
approach to device regulation, sorting devices into three classes (I, II, and III)
according to the kinds of controls that are necessary to ensure their safety and
effectiveness.40 Only the riskiest Class III devices require “premarket
approval” from FDA before they may be sold, while intermediate risk Class II
devices may be sold after a less onerous “premarket clearance” process
(sometimes called “510(k) clearance” after the relevant statutory provision).41
Even for Class III devices that require premarket approval, the burden and cost
are considerably less than for premarket approval of drugs. Whenever possible,
FDA relies less heavily on premarket testing and more on post-approval
monitoring and data collection to ensure safety and effectiveness for devices.42
Sometimes the FDA regulates specific genetic tests as “companion
diagnostics” for new drugs that target the specific mutations that these tests
detect, approving the diagnostic and therapeutic products together.43
Coordinated submission of data on both products can be advantageous for drug
companies seeking approval for targeted therapies.44 Using a validated
diagnostic to screen patients for participation in clinical trials may allow a new
drug to get approval after trials that are smaller and shorter in duration than
FDA would otherwise require.45 This is because the diagnostic allows the
sponsor to design the trial to focus on patients who have the targeted mutation
and are therefore likely to respond to the drug.46 Put differently, trial results

39.
U.S.
Food
&
Drug
Admin.,
Classify
Your
Medical
Device,
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice
/default.htm [https://perma.cc/48M3-N4WS].
40. 21 U.S.C. § 360c et seq.
41.
U.S.
Food
&
Drug
Admin.,
Overview
of
Device
Regulation,
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/default.htm
[https://perma.cc/Q9TN-FENQ].
42. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Balancing Premarket and Postmarket Data Collection for
Devices Subject to Premarket Approval: Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration
Staff,
6
(2015),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/u
cm393994.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4YZ-VTHM].
43. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., In Vitro Companion Diagnostic Devices: Guidance for Industry
and
Food
and
Drug
Administration
Staff,
6
(2014),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocument
s/UCM262327.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LFA-N6RL].
44. Papadopoulos et al., supra note 9, at 993–94.
45.
45. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., In Vitro Companion Diagnostic Devices: Guidance
for
Industry
and
Food
and
Drug
Administration
Staff,
8
(2014),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocument
s/UCM262327.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2JE-BAAB].
46. Papadopoulos et al., supra note 9 at 993.
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are more likely to favor a given drug if a genetic test administered before the
trial allows a drug company to exclude patients who are unlikely to respond to
the targeted therapy because they do not have the targeted mutation. Drug
companies are therefore motivated to do the necessary trials to validate the
clinical significance of diagnostics that detect these targeted mutations, whether
or not they can patent the validated tests themselves. Validating the tests will
expedite approval to sell the new, and presumably patented, drugs that target
the mutations that the tests detect.47
The FDA has generally classified companion diagnostics for targeted
therapies as Class III medical devices, requiring premarket approval.48 But
FDA Guidance Documents have indicated that FDA might in future cases allow
companion diagnostic devices to use the less onerous “premarket notification”
clearance process for Class II devices if FDA determines that such a process is
sufficient to provide a reasonable assurance of safety and efficacy.49 As FDA
explained in 2014:
FDA will apply a risk-based approach to determine the regulatory
pathway for IVD [in vitro diagnostic] companion diagnostic devices, as
it does with all medical devices. This means that the regulatory pathway
will depend on the level of risk to patients, based on the intended use
of the IVD companion diagnostic device and the controls necessary to
provide a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness. Thus, the
level of risk together with available controls to mitigate risk will
establish whether an IVD companion diagnostic device requires a
premarket approval application (PMA) or a premarket notification
submission (510(k)).50
This is consistent with FDA’s flexible approach to device regulation.
Although typically a new type of device that is not equivalent to any previously
approved device will begin in Class III, requiring premarket approval,51 FDA
may later reevaluate this classification and permit “de novo” reclassification if
initial concerns about safety and effectiveness prove to be manageable with less
burdensome regulatory controls.52
47. See Id. at 993–94.
48. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., In Vitro Companion Diagnostic Devices: Guidance for Industry
and Food & Drug Administration Staff, 10 n.10 (2014).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 10.
51. Id. at 10 n.10; 21 U.S. Code § 360c(f)(1).
52. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., De Novo Classification Process (Evaluation of Automatic Class
III Designation): Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff, 5 (2017),
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Another important limitation on FDA regulation of diagnostic tests has
provided a huge break for genetic testing laboratories without regard to their
medical device classification. As a matter of administrative discretion, FDA
has so far chosen not to require approval or clearance of what it calls
“laboratory developed tests.”53 A laboratory developed test (LDT) is a
diagnostic test that is designed, manufactured, and used all within the same
laboratory, rather than sold or licensed for use in other facilities.54 This is an
old policy dating back to the 1970s that has allowed many laboratories to
provide genetic testing services without the burden of FDA regulation.55 A few
years ago, FDA appeared to be on the verge of reconsidering this discretionary
policy.56 In a Draft Guidance issued in 2014, FDA proposed to use expert
advisory committees to determine the level of risk posed by different kinds of
LDTs and to enforce their existing authorities to regulate some kinds of LDTs
more aggressively.57 But in the final days of the Obama administration, FDA
put these plans on hold.58 For now at least, most laboratories that perform
genetic testing services do not need approval or clearance for their tests from
the FDA. In this environment, when an applicant has sought FDA approval for
a genetic test, it has generally been for a specific companion diagnostic product
developed in tandem with a targeted drug and used to identify which patients
are likely to respond to that drug.
Meanwhile, more-comprehensive genetic tests that use NGS technology to
examine hundreds of genes to detect mutations driving a patient’s cancer have
become available without FDA approval or clearance. These tests have
proliferated in both academic medical centers59 and commercial laboratories.60
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocument
s/ucm080197.pdf [https://perma.cc/4D7S-A9PR].
53. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Draft Guidance for Industry, Food and Drug Administration
Staff, and Clinical Laboratories: Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests,
6 (2014).
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id. at 12.
57. Id.
58. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Discussion Paper on Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs), 1
(Jan.
17,
2017),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/productsandmedicalprocedures/invitrodiagnostics/la
boratorydevelopedtests/ucm536965.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E7K-L557].
59. See, e.g., D.T. Cheng et al., Memorial Sloan Kettering-Integrated Mutation
Profiling of Actionable Cancer Targets (MSK-IMPACT): A Hybridization Capture-Based
Next-Generation Sequencing Clinical Assay for Solid Tumor Molecular Oncology, 17 J. MOLECULAR
DIAGNOSTICS 251, 251 (2015).
60. See, e.g., Garrett M. Frampton et al., Development and validation of a clinical cancer
genomic profiling test based on massively parallel DNA sequencing, 31 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1023, 1024 (2013).
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Perhaps the successful development of this new technology, in the face of
considerable uncertainty about the availability of patents, suggests a need to
refine the conventional wisdom about the role of patents in providing incentives
for biomedical innovation.
IV. LEGAL REGULATION OUTSIDE THE PATENT SYSTEM
Before we discard the conventional wisdom, we should consider two
explanations for why this particular technology might flourish in the absence
of patents. Both of these explanations are consistent with the familiar story
from the pharmaceutical industry that it needs patents to cover high costs of
product development. First, perhaps innovators are willing to invest in LDTs
only because of the FDA’s exercise of administrative discretion, at least so far,
to refrain from regulating these products. This explanation leaves open the
possibility that patents may be necessary to motivate investment in more
heavily regulated therapeutic products such as drugs. Second, perhaps
pharmaceutical firms are willing to invest in genetic companion diagnostic
products because it helps them to develop and get regulatory approval for
lucrative new patent-protected drugs targeted against specific mutations.
Indeed, as explained earlier, development and validation of companion
diagnostics may accelerate FDA approval of these targeted drugs.
In both of these stories, innovators seek to avoid the costs of FDA
regulation and are more inclined to invest in the face of lower regulatory costs
and risks. In this sense, these stories are also consistent with broader narratives
about costly regulation as a drag on innovation.61
Neither of these stories explains why laboratories that offer genetic testing
of tumor DNA have begun to seek FDA approval of their products, even when
it is not legally necessary because the products qualify as LDTs. Laboratories
are free to offer these tests without the FDA’s blessing, and in fact they are
already lawfully offering them before they voluntarily submit applications to
the FDA.62 Last year, the FDA approved two very similar NGS tests for LDTs
that detect mutations in hundreds of genes in tumor DNA samples.63 One

61. DiMasi et al., supra note 35, at 26 (noting that for approved drugs, the “fully capitalized
total cost estimate is $2558 million.”).
62. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Draft Guidance for Industry, Food and Drug Administration
Staff, and Clinical Laboratories: Framework for Regulatory Oversight of Laboratory-Developed Tests
(LDTs), 6 (Oct. 3, 2014), (noting that the FDA does not always enforce LDT regulation),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocument
s/UCM416685.pdf [https://perma.cc/RY85-WR63].
63.
Letter from Reena Philip to Christine England (Nov. 15, 2017),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf17/DEN170058.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y3C6-LEFZ]
[hereinafter Philip Letter MSKCC]; Letter from Reena Philip to Christine Vietz (Nov. 30, 2017),
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application was from Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center (MSKCC) for
FDA clearance of its IMPACT test as a Class II device.64 The other was an
application from a private firm, Foundation Medicine, for premarket approval
of its Foundation One test as a Class III device.65 The choices of different
regulatory pathways have had interesting consequences that I will consider
soon.
But first, why would these laboratories take upon themselves the costs and
risks of submitting their products to FDA regulation when FDA does not
require it? The short answer is that health insurers were refusing to pay for
testing. This itself is a bit of a puzzle, since the cost of testing is trivial
compared to the overall costs of cancer care.66 It is not obvious why insurers
that readily pay in excess of $100,000 a year for expensive new targeted drugs
would decline to pay a few thousand bucks up-front for testing that might reveal
in a single test whether the patient is a candidate for any of more than a dozen
previously approved cancer therapies.67 Some insurers are willing to cover less
comprehensive genetic tests that focus only on clinically validated mutations
that have been shown to predict treatment response, but not the moreinformative tests that sequence more DNA and are likely to reveal mutations of
unknown significance in hundreds of genes.68 This position follows model
coverage guidelines for NGS testing in oncology, as proposed in 2015 by the
Green Park Collaborative-USA, a multi-stakeholder program hosted by the
nonprofit Center for Medical Technology Policy.69
Although the difference in cost between limited testing to detect particular
validated mutations and more-comprehensive testing that will reveal many
more mutations is small, some insurers see an important principle at stake: their
role is to pay for clinically validated care, but not experimental care, and
certainly not research.70 There is some truth to the charge that coverage for
broader genetic testing would have the effect of using insurance to pay for

https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf17/P170019a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T6MZ-GV5W]
[hereinafter Philip Letter Foundation].
64. Philip Letter MSKCC, supra note 63.
65. Philip Letter Foundation, supra note 63.
66. Rebecca Eisenberg & Harold Varmus, Insurance for Broad Genomic Tests in Oncology,
358 SCIENCE 1133, 1134 (2017).
67. Id. at 1133–34.
68. Green Park Collaborative. Initial Medical Policy and Model Coverage Guidelines for
Clinical
Next
Generation
Sequencing
in
Oncology,
2
(Aug.
17,
2015),
http://www.cmtpnet.org/docs/resources/Full_Release_Version_August_13__2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HU2Y-NVJ9].
69. Id.
70. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Shifting institutional roles in biomedical innovation in a learning
healthcare system, 14 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 1139, 1141 (2018).
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research.71 Although there is immediate clinical value in genetic testing to
identify candidates for targeted therapies, there is also considerable research
value in detecting additional mutations in genes that are known to play a role
in cancer.72 The biological significance of these mutations may not be clear
yet, but they are suspects that may prove to be culprits in driving cancers.
Tracking these mutations in registries of cancer patients, along with their health
records, would provide valuable data for researchers seeking a better
understanding of cancer, perhaps enabling future improvements in cancer
treatment. NGS testing uncovers both clinically validated mutations that are
targeted by FDA-approved drugs and other mutations of unknown significance.
In other words, genetic testing has significant value as data collection for
research, in addition to its immediate value in matching patients with currently
available treatments.
Insurers have a tradition of not paying for research, at least as a formal
matter.73 But, in fact, insurers have always paid for innovative treatment
choices that have not yet been validated through clinical trials.74 Even when
FDA requires premarket testing for drugs and medical devices, substantial
questions about clinical validity and utility may remain at the point of initial
approval—questions that can be answered only in the course of subsequent
clinical care.75 Many healthcare innovations do not require FDA approval at
all. The FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine, and caregivers are
free to adopt new innovations in the course of clinical care without first having
to await studies that would satisfy the FDA’s standards for proof of safety and
efficacy.76 Insurers might balk at paying for an expensive new procedure, such
as autologous bone marrow transplantation for cancer patients, on the grounds
that it is experimental, but much experimental medical care flies beneath the
radar of insurance gatekeepers and gets covered based on the choices of
caregivers.77 Insurance coverage is especially important to facilitate innovation
in areas that are not regulated by the FDA, because without FDA demanding
data from clinical trials, it is less likely that innovators will collect data prior to
71. Eisenberg & Varmus, supra note 67, at 1133.
72. Id.
73. Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 1141, 1150.
74. Richard R. Nelson et al., How Medical Know-How Progresses, 40 RESEARCH POL’Y 1339,
1341 (2011); Eisenberg & Varmus, supra note 67, at 1134.
75. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Balancing Premarket and Postmarket Data Collection for
Devices Subject to Premarket Approval: Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration
Staff,
9
(2015),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/u
cm393994.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MUS-UQWS].
76. Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 1143.
77. Id. at 1153-54.
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clinical use in the course of health care.78 Moreover, clinical use is unlikely to
proceed in the absence of insurance coverage, making insurance coverage
important to spur innovation.
Therein lies the Catch-22 for unregulated NGS genetic testing: insurers will
not pay for testing unless the results have validated clinical significance.79 Drug
companies will pay for premarket validation of the relatively small number of
mutations that allow them to get targeted therapies approved by the FDA. But
beyond these “druggable” mutations, drug companies have less interest in
understanding the clinical significance of the much larger universe of variants
in genes that play a role in cancer. Because many of these variants are relatively
rare, it is not economically feasible to study them in premarket clinical trials on
the scale that drug companies typically undertake in pursuit of FDA approval.80
Studies in much larger populations of patients are necessary to correlate these
variants with health outcomes in order to validate their clinical significance, a
job better done in observational studies in the course of clinical care.81 But
clinical care will not happen without insurance coverage. Validation requires
use in clinical care, use in clinical care requires insurance coverage, and
insurance coverage requires validation.82
This dilemma highlights an important function of FDA regulation that goes
far towards explaining why innovators might seek FDA approval for new
technologies that they are free to market without that approval: the FDA
performs a technology assessment function that public and private insurers rely
on in deciding what they will pay for.83 For public insurance such as Medicare,
federal law authorizes payment for “reasonable and necessary” care.84 Centers
for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) regulations interpret this language
to exclude “experimental” care.85 Private insurance policies often include
similar language, and private insurers often follow the lead of Medicare in
deciding what they will cover, although they need not do so as a matter of law.86
“Reasonable and necessary” care under the laws governing Medicare
coverage is not necessarily the same thing as “safe” and “effective” care under

78. Eisenberg & Varmus, supra note 67, at 1133.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1134.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1133.
83. Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 1154.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A).
85. 42 C.F.R. § 411.15(o).
86. James D. Chambers et al., Private Payers Disagree with Medicare Over Medical Device
Coverage About Half the Time, 34 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1376, 1382 (2015).
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the laws administered by the FDA.87 Nonetheless, for the most part, health
insurers provide coverage of FDA-approved technologies, although they may
require prior authorization when cheaper alternatives are available.88
Sometimes federal or state law mandates require them to cover these products,89
and sometimes they are simply avoiding the burden of conducting their own
technology assessment by relying on the FDA’s determinations.
This is a significant benefit of FDA approval that may explain why
innovators such as Foundation Medicine and MSKCC decided voluntarily to
submit their products to FDA regulation even though they are not required to
do so. Perhaps they hoped that FDA approval would serve as a good enough
proxy for clinical utility to persuade insurers to pay for testing. This is
particularly clear in the case of Foundation Medicine, which took advantage of
a coordinated parallel review process that involves overlapping review of some
new technologies by FDA and CMS in order to facilitate earlier access to new
technologies for Medicare beneficiaries.90
As I noted earlier, Foundation Medicine and MSKCC pursued different
regulatory pathways for similar tests at FDA. Foundation Medicine chose the
more arduous pathway. They sought FDA approval of their test as a Class III
medical device, calling it a “companion diagnostic” that was intended to be
used “to identify patients who may benefit from treatment with” a list of
targeted therapies previously approved by FDA “in accordance with the
approved therapeutic product labeling,” as well as for “tumor mutation
profiling . . . by qualified health care professionals in accordance with
professional guidelines.”91 MSKCC asked FDA to classify their test as a Class
II device,92 allowing use of the less arduous “premarket clearance” or “510(k)”
process.93 To approve this classification, FDA had to determine that the lesser
regulatory controls applicable to Class II devices were sufficient to ensure that
the device was safe and effective for its intended use.94 MSKCC characterized

87. Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 1151.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(A).
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(2) (requiring state Medicaid programs that choose to cover
drug to cover all FDA-approved drugs, with limited exceptions); 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(t)(2)(B) (requiring
health insurers to cover all FDA-approved cancer drugs); 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3) (allowing
private insurers that provide prescription drug coverage under Medicare Part D to determine which
drugs within a therapeutic class to include in preferred formularies).
90. Food and Drug Admin., Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Serv., and Health & Human
Services, Program for Parallel Review of Medical Devices, Fed. Reg. 81, 73113, 73114 (Oct. 24,
2016).
91. Philip Letter Foundation, supra note 63.
92. Philip Letter MSKCC, supra note 63.
93. Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act 510(k), codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360(k).
94. 21 U.S.C. 360c(a).
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its product as a “tumor profiling test” that is intended “for use by qualified
health care professionals in accordance with professional guidelines,” but
unlike Foundation Medicine they did not call it a “companion diagnostic,”
instead indicating that it is “not conclusive or prescriptive for labeled use of
any specific therapeutic product.”95 FDA gave each applicant the approval or
clearance it sought. But the difference between FDA’s approval for the
Foundation One test as a “companion diagnostic” and clearance for the
MSKCC test as a “tumor profiling test” seems to have made a big difference to
CMS.96
On the same day that FDA approved the Foundation One test as a
companion diagnostic, CMS issued a proposed national coverage determination
for “Next Generation Sequencing for Medicare Beneficiaries with Advanced
Cancer,” opening up a window for the submission of public comments.97 Under
part A of that proposed decision, CMS would authorize Medicare coverage of
NGS testing for Medicare beneficiaries with advanced cancer who have not
previously had the same test if the test is “an FDA-approved companion in vitro
diagnostic” and “used in a cancer with an FDA-approved companion diagnostic
indication.”98 That was sufficient to provide Medicare coverage for the
Foundation One test, because it is an FDA-approved companion diagnostic.
But the MSKCC test was a tumor-profiling test, not a companion diagnostic.99
Moreover, as a Class II device, it was technically “cleared” through a
“premarket notification” process rather than “FDA-approved.”100 For products
that are not companion diagnostics and that are merely “FDA-cleared” rather
than “FDA-approved,” CMS proposed more limited coverage under Part B of
its proposed decision.101 Under Part B, CMS proposed to authorize “coverage
with evidence development,” or CED, only for patients enrolled in certain
clinical trials or data registries.102
95. Philip Letter MSKCC, supra note 63.
96. See Philip Letter MSKCC, supra note 63 (noting the device should be classified as Class
II); See Philip Letter Foundation, supra note 63 (noting the test should be classified as Class III).
97. Philip Letter Foundation, supra note 64. See Center for Medicare & Medicaid Serv.,
Proposed Decision Memo for Next Generation Sequencing (NGS) for Medicare Beneficiaries with
Advanced
Cancer
(November
30,
2017),
https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coveragedatabase/details/nca-proposed-decisionmemo.aspx?NCAId=290&bc=AAAAAAAAAAQAAA%3D%3D [https://perma.cc/3HVB-V9FY].
98. Id.; Center for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., Decision Memo for Next Generation
Sequencing (NGS) for Medicare Beneficiaries with Advanced Cancer (March 16, 2018),
https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/details/nca-decisionmemo.aspx?NCAId=290&bc=AAAAAAAAACAA& [https://perma.cc/B5PZ-H2CU].
99. See Philip Letter MSKCC, supra note 63.
100. 21 U.S.C. § 360c et seq. (requiring only Class III devices go through pre market approval).
101. Center for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., Proposed Decision Memo (November 30, 2017).
102. Id.

EISENBERG_12820 (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

OPTING INTO DEVICE REGULATION

2/4/20 10:17 AM

17

CED is an interesting innovation that provides Medicare funding for some
experimental technologies, but only for use in ongoing studies. The goal of
CED is to collect data to permit later evaluation of the technology so that CMS
can make a more informed decision about coverage.103 CED is an interesting
departure from the traditional refusal of insurers to pay for research that would
permit insurers to conduct their own technology assessment on the effects of
healthcare technologies in clinical use. So far, it has mostly been used for new
medical procedures that do not require FDA approval, like autologous bone
marrow transplants for cancer patients. Sometimes the result has been to
generate data that prevented costly and toxic new technologies from becoming
the standard of care.104 For NGS genetic testing, CED could provide a solution
to the Catch-22 problem that arises when insurance coverage is necessary to
achieve data collection on a meaningful scale to determine the clinical
significance of rare genetic variants. The data collected in patient registries if
testing were provided under CED would be a valuable resource for cancer
researchers, in addition to its value in assessing clinical outcomes for patients
that get testing.
Nonetheless, from the perspective of the laboratories that provide testing,
CED is clearly inferior to full coverage not limited to those patients willingly
participating in clinical trials or registries. Many patients and caregivers that
are interested in genetic testing of their tumors can be expected to prefer to use
an FDA-approved test that Medicare will cover without further requirements
rather than an otherwise similar test that will be covered only if they are willing
to serve as research subjects and make their data available to researchers. The
difference in treatment would thus make it advantageous for other testing
laboratories to follow the more arduous regulatory path of Foundation
Medicine, seeking premarket approval of their tests as Class III companion
diagnostic products, rather than the less arduous regulatory path taken by
MSKCC, which sought premarket clearance for their test as a Class II tumor
103. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., Guidance for the Public, Industry, and CMS
Staff: Coverage with Evidence Development (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.cms.gov/medicarecoverage-database/details/medicare-coverage-document-details.aspx?MCDId=27
[https://perma.cc/NM77-3ADL].
104. See, e.g., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., DECISION MEMO FOR LUNG
VOLUME
REDUCTION
SURGERY
(CAG
00115R),
3
(August
20,
2003),
https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/details/nca-decisionmemo.aspx?NCAId=96&ver=7&NcaName=Lung+Volume+Reduction+Surgery&SearchType=Adva
nced&CoverageSelection=Both&NCSelection=NCA%7CCAL%7CNCD%7CMEDCAC%7CTA%7
CMCD&ArticleType=Ed%7CKey%7CSAD%7CFAQ&PolicyType=Final&s=—%7C5%7C6%7C66%7C67%7C9%7C38%7C63%7C41%7C64%7C65%7C44&KeyWord=Lung+V
olume+Reduction+Surgery&KeyWordLookUp=Doc&KeyWordSearchType=And&kq=true&bc=IA
AAABAAIAAA& (explaining LVRS is appropriate for only certain patients)
[https://perma.cc/GLW3-LN73].
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profiling test. The proposed decision could thus be expected to lead innovators
to opt for heightened FDA regulation, even though they are not legally required
to incur this more costly burden.
After receiving hundreds of comments on its proposed decision, CMS
modified its final national coverage determination to eliminate the provision
for CED and to provide full coverage for both “FDA-cleared” and “FDAapproved” tests.105 But the final decision retains the limitation on coverage to
“companion diagnostics,” thus excluding nationwide coverage of the MSKCC
test that FDA cleared as a “tumor profiling test,” although regional Medicare
Administrative Contractors may provide coverage of other NGS tests within
their territories if they so choose.106 As modified, the decision no longer steers
innovators towards a more costly regulatory pathway than FDA requires, so
long as the FDA is willing to affirm the utility of the test as a companion
diagnostic.107
The decision memo reads like an exercise in technology assessment by
CMS to determine whether NGS testing in cancer patients meets its standards
for reasonably and necessary care.108 It devotes many pages to reviewing the
published literature on the clinical utility of NGS testing for cancer patients.109
Yet little use is made of this bibliography to support the terms of the final
national coverage determination.110 In the end, it appears that CMS’s coverage
decision rests more on FDA’s technology assessment than on its own.111
CONCLUSION
In addition to its role as a regulatory of new medical technologies, FDA
plays an important role in technology assessment. FDA approval or clearance
of a new technology makes doctors and patients more willing to use it and
insurers more willing to pay for it, even when the FDA would otherwise do
nothing to stop the technology from reaching the market. Although public and
105. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Serv., Decision Memo for Net Generation Sequencing
(NGS) for Medicare Beneficiaries with Advanced Cancer (CAG-00450N), 3 (March 16, 2018),
https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/details/nca-decision-memo.aspx?NCAId=290
[hereinafter Final CMS Decision Memo] [https://perma.cc/KKM2-9YEE].
106. Id.
107. The Final CMS Decision Memo notes that after it released its proposed decision, FDA
“cleared” a companion diagnostic as a Class II device, indicating FDA’s willingness to use this
pathway for companion diagnostics with appropriate evidence. Id. at 102.
108. Id. at 12–68 (reviewing various articles on clinical trials involving NGS for cancer
treatment).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 3 (stating that coverage expands to those tests that have received FDA approval or
clearance).
111. Id.
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private insurers could and sometimes do perform their own technology
assessment, it is often cheaper and easier to free ride on the work done by FDA.
The willingness of CMS to provide Medicare coverage for FDA-approved or
FDA-cleared NGS genetic tests suggests it is comfortable giving great
deference to FDA’s technology assessment. Although CMS considered using
CED to get more data on the clinical utility of NGS testing for cancer patients,
it ultimately decided not to bother. This may have been a missed opportunity
to collect more data that could improve cancer care for the Medicare
population.
This case study sheds an interesting light on the interacting regulatory
regimes that set the stage for biomedical innovation. Patent law is often a
crucial part of the regulatory environment that supports biomedical innovation,
but not always. With or without patents, innovators cannot make money unless
new technologies are adopted. In the healthcare context, this means persuading
caregivers to prescribe new products, and persuading insurers to cover them.
Sometimes federal and state laws mandate insurance coverage for certain kinds
of care, such as FDA-approved cancer drugs, but sometimes it is up to public
and private insurers to decide what counts as reasonable and necessary care.
Yet even when they are free to make their own coverage determinations,
insurers may prefer to rely on the assessments of trusted regulators. This may
lead innovators to seek regulatory approval even when regulators do not require
it.
You have to look beyond patent law to understand the rules that determine
how innovators will pay for the development of new technologies, even within
the patent law heartland of biomedical innovation. For now, at least, the end of
patents on diagnostics does not seem to mean the end of innovation in this
important field. And surprisingly, regulatory entry barriers may prove to be a
part of the solution rather than a part of the problem.

